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ON WISCONSIN: SOME FRIENDLY
CONSTITUTIONAL ADVICE
WILLIAM A. NISKANEN*
On reading the Constitution of the State of Wisconsin, I am
reminded that one's understanding of a constitution is very dependent
on a detailed understanding of the history of the political community for
which it is presumably the higher law. In retrospect, when I wrote an
article on the proposed constitution for the European Union,1 I had a
much better understanding of the relevant European history than my
current understanding of the relevant Wisconsin history. So any
number of provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution seem odd or
puzzling to me, and I ask you to forgive a friendly stranger for my
innocent mistakes. I am especially intrigued to understand why the
longest section of the constitution is a detailed set of rules about
gambling.2 And why several sections describe the authority of state
officials to repel an invasion3 or to charge someone with treason,4 not
being aware that Wisconsin was ever threatened by invasion or
subversion.
I. THE STATE OF WISCONSIN
As an economist, I am first inclined to survey the economy and
government of a state before passing judgment about whether some
change in the constitution is likely to be valuable. The data summarized
in the following tables, most of which are in the Statistical Abstract of the
United States for 2006,' proved to be the most accessible and helpful.
* William A. Niskanen, an economist, is chairman of the Cato Institute in Washington,
D.C. He had previously served as a member and acting chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisers under President Reagan. Ph.D., University of Chicago 1962; B.A., with high honors,
Harvard College 1954.
1. William A. Niskanen, Advice from a Friendly American on the Proposed Constitution
for the European Union, in COERCIVE POWER AND ITS ALLOCATION IN THE EMERGENT
EUROPE 17 (Geoffrey Brennan ed., 2005).
2. See WiS. CONST. art. IV, § 24.
3. See WIS. CONST. art. VIII, § 7(1).
4. See WIS. CONST. art. I, § 10.
5. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2006,
available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2006/2006edition.html.
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GENERAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
Annual Percentage Change 1990-2004 Nation Wisconsin
Real Gross State Product6  3.2% 3.6%
Population7  1.2% 0.9%
Real Personal Income Per Capita 8  1.7% 2.0%
Recent Economic Conditions
Personal Income Per Capita (2004) 9  $32,937 $32,157
Average Annual Salary (2003)10 $37,765 $33,425
Employment Rate (2004)11 62.3% 68.1%
Unemployment Rate (2004) 12 5.5% 5.0%
Poverty Rate (2003) 13  12.7% 10.5%
For the most part, general economic conditions in Wisconsin are
quite favorable. The increases in real gross state product and real
personal income per capita from 1990 through 2004 were higher than
the national average. 14 The rate of population growth was somewhat
lower than the national average, although higher than in any other state
in the Great Lakes region.15 The Wisconsin economy appears to have
adjusted better to the decline in manufacturing employment than any
other state in this region, probably due to the higher diversity of
manufacturing employment by industry. 16 Recent economic conditions
in Wisconsin are also quite favorable. Personal income per capita in
Wisconsin is about the same as the national average despite a
significantly lower average salary, primarily because of an unusually
high employment rate.' The primary economic policy challenge
suggested by these data is to increase the average salary of Wisconsin
workers; the most effective way to achieve this objective, according to
6. Id. at 446 tbl.654.
7. Id. at 21 tbl.17.
8. Id. at 452 tbl.662.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 427 tbl.630
11. Id. at 390 tbl.581
12. Id.
13. Id. at 471 tbl.692
14. Id. at 446 tbl.654
15. Id. at 21 tbl.17.
16. Id. at 390 tbl.58
17. Id. at 452 tbl.662
p.
452 tbl.662.
1.
,, 427 tbl.630, 390 tbl581.
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Terry Ludeman, may be to provide incentives to reduce the substantial
outmigration of Wisconsin college graduates."8 The general economic
conditions in Wisconsin, however, are not sufficient to make the case for
a significant change in the Wisconsin Constitution.
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT CONDITIONS
Nation Wisconsin
Expenditures Per Capita (2002)19 $6,026 $6,251
Tax Revenue Per Capita 21 $3,143 $3,421
Top Personal Tax Rate (2006)21 5.5% 6.8%
Top Corporate Tax Rate (2006)22 6.9% 7.9%
Budget Balance Per Capita (2002) 3  -$160 -$267
Employees Per 100 Residents (2003)24 5.42 5.26
Average Annual Salary25  $43,056 $44,298
Expenditures, taxes, and borrowing per capita by the Wisconsin
state and local governments are each somewhat higher than the national
average.26 As in most states, the balance of general revenues and
expenditures in Wisconsin was negative in 2002 but increased to a
surplus by 2004; even in 2002, however, the outstanding state and local
debt per Wisconsin resident was about 5% lower than the national
average.2 7  Somewhat surprising, the relatively high government
expenditures per capita in Wisconsin is not due to an unusually high
number of government employees; the number of full-time equivalent
state and local government employees per capita is 3% lower than the
18. Terry Ludeman, former Chief Economist for Wis. Dep't. of Workforce Dev.,
Address at Wisconsin Constitution Conference - Is the Wisconsin Constitution Obsolete?,
(Oct. 6, 2006), audio available at http://Iaw.marquette.edu/webcasts/events/wi/06-
TerryLudeman.mp3.
19. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 5, at 285 tbl.431.
20. Id. at 287 tbl.432.
21. FED'N OF TAX ADM'RS, STATE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATES TABLE (2006),
available at http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/ind-inc.pdf.
22. FED'N OF TAX ADM'RS, STATE CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES TABLE (2006),
available at http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/corpjinc.pdf.
23. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 5, at 287 tbl.432.
24. Id. at 311 tbl.456.
25. Id.
26. See supra text accompanying notes 19-23.
27. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 5, at 287 tbl.432.
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national average, offset by an average salary that is about 3% higher.'
The average salary of state and local employees in Wisconsin, however,
is about one-third higher than the average salary of all employees in the
state, whereas the national average salary of state and local employees is
14% higher than the average salary of all employees; 9 this raises the
question whether some change in the structure of government in
Wisconsin would make it possible to hire qualified employees at a lower
salary to provide some tax-financed services.
A more important question is whether the residents of Wisconsin
value the level and quality of government services in the state by enough
to offset their higher taxes. For the moment, that seems to be the case;
Wisconsin is the only state in the Great Lakes region to experience a net
internal immigration from 2000 through 2004.' State and local
government conditions in Wisconsin are also not sufficient to make a
case for a significant change in the Wisconsin Constitution.
But good enough for government work is not good enough. The
citizens of Wisconsin should consider changes to the Constitution of
Wisconsin that would make their economic and political conditions
demonstrably superior to those in other states.
II. THE FISCAL CONSTITUTION
Professor McChrystal asked me to address the constitutional rules
bearing on spending and taxes and I agreed, subject to the opportunity
to address one other topic as well. I have been thinking about state
fiscal constitutions for about thirty years, first serving on the committee
that drafted Proposition 1 in California3 (along with Anthony Kennedy,
now a Justice of the Supreme Court), as chairman of the committee that
drafted the Headlee Amendment in Michigan,32 and as a friend of
several people that have recently been promoting TABOR-like
amendments33 in other states.
28. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
29. See supra text accompanying notes 10, 25.
30. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 5, at 24 tbl.20.
31. Proposition 1 provided for tax and expenditure limitations on state government to be
included in the California state constitution. See LEWIS K. UHLER, SETTING LIMITS:
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT 175-177 (1989); see also California Ballot
Proposition 1 (1973), available at http://library.uchastings.edulballot-pdf/1973s.pdf.
32. MICH. CONST. art. IX, §§ 25-34.
33. See, e.g., Assemb. J. Res. 55, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2003).
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A. The Wisconsin Fiscal Constitution
My reading of the written Constitution of the State of Wisconsin,
however, provided very little guidance about the effective fiscal
constitution. For routine budget decisions, according to article VIII,
section 5, the legislature is instructed to limit estimated expenditures to
estimated revenues for each year with any actual deficit to be repaid in
the following year." The quorum for such decisions, according to
section 8, is three-fifths of the members of each house.35
For extraordinary expenditures, according to section 6, the
legislature is allowed to contract debt with such debt to be retired within
five years, "but such debts shall never in the aggregate exceed one
hundred thousand dollars. 3 6 (A reality check: the outstanding debt of
the State of Wisconsin was nearly $15 billion in 2002.)"7 Such debts must
be approved by a majority of all members elected to each house." And
one wonders what might constitute an extraordinary expenditure, for
section 10 states that "the state may never contract ... debt for
internal improvement."'3 9
The long and complicated section 7 appears to override any of the
above fiscal constraints but provides no clear guidance about what is the
effective fiscal constitution.' I have not studied the implicit fiscal rules
of the Wisconsin legislature, but I doubt that they are consistent with
any of these provisions of the written fiscal constitution.
B. Changes to Consider
What, if any, changes in the Wisconsin fiscal constitution should be
considered?
First, I do not support a TABOR-like amendment for several
reasons: such amendments limit the rate of growth of state spending to
the inflation rate plus the rate of growth of the population, but they
have not proven to be stable. As far as I know, all such amendments at
the state level have been subject to suspension or the exemption of some
major types of spending or revenues. Second, any temporary increase in
spending has a ratchet effect on future spending. More important, such
34. WIS. CONST. art. VIII, § 5.
35. Id. art. VIII, § 8.
36. Id. art. VIII, § 6.
37. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 5, at 296 tbl.440.
38. WIS. CONST. art. VIII, § 6.
39. Id. art. VIII, § 10.
40. Id. art. VIII, § 7.
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amendments make state spending independent of real per capita
income, and thus, do not give those who provide or most value state
services a stake in economic growth. In some cases, of course, a general
reduction in state spending and tax revenues may increase economic
growth, but many other state policies also influence economic growth.
For example, the composition of state spending, the level of marginal
tax rates, the details of regulation and commercial law, etc., also affect
economic growth but are not addressed by a general limit on state
spending and tax revenues. A fiscal rule that permits some increase in
state spending in response to an increase in real per capita income is
necessary to encourage those who especially benefit from state spending
to pay attention to these other policies that also affect economic growth.
Again, what, if any, changes in the fiscal constitution should be
considered?
Let's start with the several objectives that you may, or maybe
should, be trying to accomplish by an amendment to the constitution:
" Stabilize the state government spending and tax revenue share of
personal income, unless changed by a broadly supported political
decision,
" Stabilize the level of state government spending relative to
temporary changes in state economic conditions,
" Improve the incentives of those who make the state's fiscal
decisions,
" Reduce the dependence of the budget process on estimates, and
* Express the fiscal rules in clear, concise constitutional language.
The following fiscal rules, I suggest, are consistent with each of these
objectives:
Suggested Fiscal Rules
1. State general expenditures in any fiscal year may not exceed one
hundred ten percent of the state general revenues in the second
prior fiscal year without the approval of a majority of those
elected to each house of the legislature.
2. The rate or base of no state tax may be increased without the
approval by a majority of those voting in the next election for
members of the legislature.
[90:701
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3. The state must compensate local governments for the estimated
incremental cost of any new state mandate on these
governments.
Rule 1 establishes a limit on state general expenditures that is a fixed
multiple of the known level of state general revenues in the second prior
fiscal year. The specific percent in this rule should be based on the
average two-year increase in some aggregate nominal measure of the
state economy over an extended prior period. Over the period 1990
through 2004, for example, nominal personal income in Wisconsin
increased at an average two-year rate of 10.4%. 4' Since the Wisconsin
tax structure is slightly progressive, a spending limit that is 110% of the
revenues in the second prior fiscal year would maintain the spending
share of personal income over any extended period.
The two-year lag between revenues and expenditures serves several
objectives. Expenditures would be stabilized relative to short-run
changes in the state economy; expenditures during the weak economy of
2002, for example, would be based on the revenues in the strong
economy of 2000. The fiscal incentives of both voters and legislators
would be better when any increase in tax rates must be approved by the
voters two years before the legislature may approve a spending increase.
In addition, as mentioned before, this type of spending rule increases
the incentive to promote measures that increase economic growth,
increasing tax revenues for any given tax rates. And the two-year lag
greatly reduces the role of estimates in the budget process. There may
be occasions when it is appropriate to increase the spending limit for a
specific year; this decision can be left to the legislature because it has no
ratchet effect on subsequent spending. The suggested quorum for this
vote is that specified for extraordinary expenditures in the constitution.42
Rule 2 establishes the level of state expenditures and tax revenues
relative to the size of the state economy, a decision that should be made
only by the voters. This rule also stabilizes the details of the tax code.
Rule 3 is necessary to constrain the state government from the
incentive to shift some of the fiscal burden of its agenda to local
governments. Any estimate of the incremental cost of a new state
mandate, of course, should be expected to provoke some controversy.
The experience in other states, however, also suggests that this rule
41. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 5, at 451 tbl.661.
42. See WIS. CONST. art. VIII, § 8.
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would increase the popular support for approving a general fiscal limit
in the state constitution.
III. THE SUPPLY OF TAX-FINANCED SERVICES
There is broad support in Wisconsin for a number of tax-financed
services. No general interest, however, is served by an explicit or
implicit constitutional rule that any such service be supplied only by a
government organization and government employees. There is no
reason to expect better service from a government monopoly than from
a private monopoly.
A. Education
The most important of these services, of course, is education. In a
1998 ruling on the amended Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin observed that "[e]ducation ranks at the
apex of a state's function."43 So it is important to evaluate the status of
public education in Wisconsin and any changes in the constitution that
would improve this status.
PUBLIC EDUCATION IN WISCONSIN
Costs and Inputs Nation Wisconsin
Annual Cost Per Student (2004) $8,237 $9,472
Teachers Per 100 Students45  6.3 6.8
Annual Teacher Salary' $46,800 $42,900
Outputs
H.S. Graduation Rate (2002-2003) 4" 73.9% 85.8%
College Board SAT (2005)8 1,028 1,191
43. Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 835, 897, 578 N.W.2d 602, 629 (1998).
44. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 5, at 156 tbl.230, 164 tbl.243.
45. Id. at 156 tbl.230, 161 tbl.238.
46. Id. at 161 tbl.238.
47. MARILYN SEASTROM ET AL., NAT'L CrR. FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEP'T. OF EDUC.,
PUBL'N No. NCES 2006-601, THE AVERAGED FRESHMAN GRADUATION RATE FOR PUBLIC
HIGH SCHOOLS FROM THE COMMON CORE OF DATA: SCHOOL YEARS 2001-02 AND 2002-
03, at 5 tbl.1 (2005), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2006/2006601.pdf.
48. COLLEGE BOARD, TABLE 3: MEAN SAT REASONING TEST VERBAL AND MATH
SCORES BY STATE, WITH CHANGES FOR SELECTED YEARS (2005), available at
http://www.collegeboard.com/prod-downloads/about/news-info/cbsenior/yr2005/table3-
mean-SAT-reasoning-test.pdf.
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The record of public education in Wisconsin is impressive relative to
the national average. The annual cost per student is 15% higher than
the national average, despite a somewhat lower average teacher salary.49
But both the percent of ninth-grade students that graduate from high
school and the SAT scores are among the several highest in the nation.'
Again, as with the general economic and state government records in
Wisconsin, the record of public education is not sufficient to make a
case for a significant change in the Wisconsin Constitution.
The problem, however, is that the current national average grossly
underestimates the potential performance of American students. The
difference between the relative and absolute performance of a school
system is illustrated by the new Cato Index of Education Market
Performance;5' Wisconsin has the highest score of any state on this index
but with an absolute score of 26 on a 100 point scale.12  Professor
Caroline Hoxby of Harvard has estimated that the average productivity
of American schools declined by around 55% (based on math tests for
nine-year-olds) or 73% (based on reading tests for seventeen-year-olds)
between the 1970-1971 and 1998-1999 school years. 3  The average
seventeen-year-old in the 1970-1971 school year had a score that fewer
than 5% of American seventeen-year-olds now attain. ' Wisconsin, in
its own interests, has the opportunity to demonstrate to the nation that
the academic performance of Wisconsin students could be dramatically
increased. As Allan Odden has emphasized, "Wisconsin needs to move
a 'good' education system to a 'great' education system."55
The education article in the Wisconsin Constitution, however,
describes a quite bureaucratic system of public education that would be
substantially regulated and financed by the state, without a hint of any
role for tax-financed private suppliers. There is an intriguing opening in
49. See supra text accompanying notes 44, 46.
50. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
51. ANDREW J. COULSON, CATO INST., POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 585, THE CATO
EDUCATION MARKET INDEX (2006), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa585.pdf.
52. Id. at 13, 14 tbl.2.
53. Caroline M. Hoxby, School Choice and School Productivity: Could School Choice be
a Tide that Lifts All Boats?, in THE ECONOMICS OF SCHOOL CHOICE 287, 289 (Caroline M.
Hoxby, ed., 2003).
54. Id.
55. Allan R. Odden, Professor, Dep't. of Educ. Leadership & Pol'y Analysis, Univ. of
Wisconsin-Madison, Address at Wisconsin Constitution Conference - Is the Wisconsin
Constitution Obsolete? (Oct. 6, 2006), audio available at http://Iaw.marquette.edu/
webcasts/events/wi/06-AllenOdden.mp3.
2007]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
the initial Declaration of Rights, however, which states that "Nothing in
this constitution shall prohibit the legislature from providing for the
safety and welfare of children by providing for the transportation of
children to and from any parochial or private school or institution of
learning. ' 5 6  So some amount and type of tax-financed support for
students attending private schools has been authorized for forty years.
More important, several decisions by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
have affirmed the constitutionality of the Milwaukee Parental Choice
Program ("MPCP") on the basis of the "public purpose doctrine, 57
although this doctrine has no basis in any specific provision of the state
constitution.
The MPCP has been one of the most successful policy experiments
in many years. State-financed vouchers were first available to students
from poor families in Milwaukee in 1990. The Wisconsin legislature has
since expanded the number of voucher-eligible students from 1% of the
Milwaukee public school enrollment to 15%, removed the restriction
that participating private schools must be nonsectarian, and reduced the
state regulations to which these schools are subject.58  The most
arbitrary of the remaining regulations is that the participating private
schools may not charge a tuition higher than the state aid per student in
the public schools, an amount about 60% of the total expenditures per
student enrolled in the public schools; this regulation severely limits the
number and types of private schools participating in the voucher
program. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin observed correctly, "the
schools participating in the amended MPCP are also subject to the
additional checks inherent in the notion of school choice., 59 The value
of the voucher is the lesser of state aid per student ($5,734 in 2004) or
the private school tuition, and state aid to the public schools is reduced
by one-half the voucher amount. So each student that attends a private
56. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 23.
57. Vincent v. Voight, 2000 WI 93, 41, 236 Wis. 2d 588, 41, 614 N.W.2d 388, 41
("[T]he purpose of [a] tax must be one which pertains to the public purpose of the district
within which the tax is to be levied and raised." (quoting Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 577,
247 N.W.2d 141, 153 (1976)); Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 835, 900, 578 N.W.2d 602, 630
(1998) ("[T]he amended MPCP does not violate the public purpose doctrine because it fulfills
a valid public purpose, and it contains sufficient and reasonable controls to attain its public
purpose."); Davis v. Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 513, 480 N.W.2d 460, 463 (1992) ("[T]he MPCP
does not violate the public purpose doctrine.").
58. Jay P. Greene et al., Effectiveness of School Choice: The Milwaukee Experiment, 31
EDUC. & URBAN SOC'Y 190, 194 (1999).
59. Jackson, 218 Wis. 2d at 899, 578 N.W.2d 602,630.
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school with a voucher increases both the state and local revenue per
student remaining in the public schools.
A careful paper by several scholars found that the academic
performance of the voucher students exceeded those voucher-eligible
students who stayed in the Milwaukee public schools by their third or
fourth year in a private school.' More interesting, Professor Hoxby's
innovative study demonstrated that the productivity growth in those
Milwaukee public schools most threatened by a potential loss of
students to voucher schools was significantly higher than in Wisconsin
schools with a similar mix of students that were not eligible for
vouchers.6" Increased competition had a powerful effect, and almost
every student was a winner. Moreover, private schools participating in
the Milwaukee voucher program are much less segregated than the
Milwaukee metropolitan area public schools, a finding consistent with
the conclusion of similar studies of the Cleveland and Washington, D.C.
schools. 62 The only significant remaining opposition to this program has
been that by public school administrators and teachers.
Based on this record, the Wisconsin legislature should now consider
the MPCP as a model for a statewide voucher program. Some language
such as the following should be considered as an amendment to the
education article of the Wisconsin constitution:
Suggested Education Rules
1. Any student eligible to attend a public primary or secondary
school is also eligible for a voucher to attend a private school,
the value of the voucher equal to the lesser of the state aid per
student in that school district and the tuition of the private
school attended.
2. State aid to local school districts would be reduced by the amount
of the vouchers to students in that district.
3. Local school districts are authorized but not required to increase
the value of the vouchers to some local students from other
revenues.
60. Greene, supra note 58, at 200.
61. Hoxby, supra note 53, at 323.
62. GREG FORSTER, SEGREGATION LEVELS IN MILWAUKEE PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND
THE MILWAUKEE VOUCHER PROGRAM, (Milton and Rose D. Friedman Foundation Aug.
2006), available at http://www.friedmanfoundation.org/milwaukee.pdf.
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Rule 1 would extend the MPCP rule to all students in the state,
regardless of location or the income of the parents. Rule 2 would
modify the MPCP rule by reducing the state aid to a local school district
by the full amount of vouchers to students in that district; this would
substantially increase the incentives of the public schools to avoid losing
voucher students to private schools. Even in this case, a voucher student
would increase the average local revenue per student remaining in a
public school. Rule 3 would authorize a school district to augment the
voucher from local revenues to meet the special expenses of some
students or to close a public school with few enrolled students.
This suggested amendment would maintain a substantial role of the
state in financing and monitoring primary and secondary education in
Wisconsin. But it would dramatically change the supply of tax-financed
education. Local school districts would have a much stronger incentive
to meet the educational demands of local voters. Parents would have a
much stronger incentive to monitor the costs and performance of the
schools that their children might attend. Innovative school
administrators and teachers would have more opportunity to
experiment. And there is every reason to expect that the performance
of Wisconsin students and the productivity of Wisconsin tax-financed
education would dramatically increase.
B. Other Services
In conclusion, I would like to leave you with one other suggested
constitutional amendment that would apply to all state services.
Consider the following language, probably as an amendment to the
Declaration of Rights:
Suggested Rule for All State Financed Services
1. Nothing in this constitution should be interpreted to imply that
any service financed by the state must necessarily be supplied by
a state or local government organization.
The primary value of this suggested rule is to avoid the type of
lawsuits that significantly delayed the implementation of the Milwaukee
voucher plan and, for the moment, have voided the Florida voucher
plan.
On Wisconsin!
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